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ALLEN C. GUELzO
“There is a clause in the Act which is likely to meet with misconstruc-
tion in Europe,” wrote Frederick Milnes Edge about the legislation 
that emancipated the slaves of the District of Columbia in April 1862, 
“namely the appropriation for colonizing the freed slaves.” Ignore it, 
Edge advised. It only “was adopted to silence the weak-nerved, whose 
name is legion—and to enable any of the slaves who see fit to emigrate 
to more genial climes.” And this, for a long time, has been the way that 
most commentators have understood colonization—a plan ostensibly 
designed to expatriate any emancipated blacks to Africa or the West 
Indies or South America, but offered mostly as a placebo to reassure 
nervous white Americans that their hiring halls and neighborhoods 
would not be swamped with cheap (and presumably undesirable) 
freedmen.
 Some placebo. It baffles us today to imagine how, even in the new 
age of steamships, anyone seriously expected that four million hu-
man beings could be uprooted and relocated like a collection of exotic 
plants. And so the first instinct we have upon meeting colonization 
is to assume that Edge was right—that all the talk about colonization 
was pure window-dressing, designed to persuade truculent white 
supremacists into dropping their last guard against emancipation, but 
nothing more. Still, there is something disturbing about the suggestion 
that the hook of emancipation should be baited with a proposition 
as noxious as colonization, and it taints the reputation of many of 
the leading lights of the antebellum antislavery movement with the 
implication that antislavery whites might actually might have been 
less concerned with the noble work of freeing a race from bondage 
than they were with the ethnic cleansing of all blacks, slave or free, 
through removal elsewhere. This uncertainty is deepened by the un-
smiling earnestness of some emancipationists toward colonization. 
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It had institutional shape in the form of the American Colonization 
Society, and it had colonial shape in the form of the dreary little settle-
ments of Liberia, which were supplied by fits and starts with small 
(and frequently doomed) deposits of freed American slaves.
 There is also a purposefulness in the rhetoric of some colonization-
ists that implies a good deal more purpose than rhetoric. Abolition 
alone, objected J. H. B. Latrobe in 1851, “could give political, but not 
social position” to the freed slaves. “It could empower the emanci-
pated slaves to hold property and to vote, which has been already 
done in some of the States; but it could not remove the prejudice which 
the white population entertain against their race.” And prejudice, 
Latrobe warned, “is traditionary; and even after the white generations 
which have seen slavery have died out, the prejudices, originating 
from that condition, will be handed down from generation to genera-
tion.” Hence, Latrobe coldly reasoned, “the colonization of the free 
negroes, and of such slaves as may be emancipated, from time to time, 
is . . . the only remedy.” Colonization quickly acquires the atmosphere 
of a lifeboat—it’s us or them.1
 Certainly, the coupling of emancipation and colonization offered 
some tactical advantages in an age that took Romantic racism as its 
default position, even if the intention behind it was never designed to 
be more than tactical. Colonization allowed some sympathetic whites 
(who knew all too well the kind of resistance to absorption into the 
American body politic that would follow emancipation) to advocate 
colonization as a practical short-cut to genuine autonomy; some white 
supremacists (those who despised slavery and slave labor) to feign 
sympathy for blacks who confronted the unfortunate but irremediable 
problem of racial bigotry, and to exercise that sympathy by showing 
them the exit door; and other white supremacists (those who frankly 
despised black people and preferred to see them in slavery rather than 
in anywhere nearby) to be bribed into supporting emancipation with 
the assurance that there would be no social price to be paid by white 
people for ending slavery, since all the freed blacks would be made 
to vanish.
 Still, it disturbs the equanimity of modern Americans, who have 
made the transition toward a color-blind society far faster and with far 
less strife than Latrobe feared possible, to discover that colonization 
was endorsed by an embarrassing number of saints in the antislavery 
 1. Major-General McClellan and the Campaign on the Yorktown Peninsula (London: Trub-
ner, 1895), 61; Latrobe, Colonization: A Notice of Victor Hugo’s Views of Slavery in the United 
States (Baltimore: John D. Toy, 1851), 12, 22.
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hagiography: Granville Sharpe (who created a colonization experi-
ment on the west coast of Africa in Sierra Leone), Daniel Webster, 
Francis Scott Key, Roger Sherman (of Amistad fame), John Marshall, 
James Monroe, the presidents of Princeton, Yale, Columbia and Har-
vard universities, John J. Crittenden, the Marquis de Lafayette, Henry 
Clay, the last surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence, 
Abraham Lincoln, and even Phineas Densmore Gurley—the pastor 
of the Lincoln family’s church in Washington. And far from being an 
impracticality, the movement of millions of Europeans around the 
globe in the nineteenth century, and the agitation of even sympathetic 
European liberals (Alexis de Tocqueville, for one) in favor of coloniza-
tion schemes gave the idea far more verisimilitude than we may like 
to think.2
 We would like to believe that the problem, a century and a half 
later, can be evaded by deciding which of the three basic motives for 
advocating colonization held the upper hand with whom, as though 
colonizationists could be sorted into good colonizationists and bad 
colonizationists—those who only used the idea as a pacifier, and those 
who were in repulsive earnest—without having to confront the stu-
pefying reality that none of these allowances rose an inch above the 
level of banal excuse. But still we do the evading, and especially in the 
case of Abraham Lincoln, whom we would prefer to render as good a 
colonizationist as we can. To that end, the following exculpations for 
Lincoln are generally trotted out in order to prove that his endorse-
ment of colonization was more harmless than it looks:
1) He only pretended to like it. Although Lincoln explicitly en-
dorsed colonization in at least eight major public speeches 
(his 1852 eulogy for Henry Clay; speeches in 1854, 1857, and 
1858 in Peoria, Springfield, and Edwardsville; his 1861 and 
1862 Annual Messages to Congress, and twice more in 1862, 
after signing the District emancipation bill and then appeal-
ing to the border state representatives to undertake emanci-
pation programs), he only did so in a spirit of “contradiction 
and ambivalence” because he genuinely was conflicted about 
 2. Massachusetts Colonization Society, American Colonization Society, and the Colony 
at Liberia (Boston: Pierce & Parker, 1831), 4; Deirdre Coleman, Romantic Colonization and 
British Anti-Slavery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8, 104; Early Lee 
Fox, The American Colonization Society, 1817–1840 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1919), 9–10; Gurley, in American Colonization Society: Addresses Delivered at Its Late 
Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. by John H.B. Latrobe, Esq. and Rev. Phinehas D. Gurley, 
D.D. (New York: T.R. Dawley, 1864), 13–16; André Jardin, Tocqueville: A Biography (New 
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1988), 447.
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the degree of racial tolerance white Americans were likely to 
show the freedmen.
2) He was only thinking of them. Although Lincoln attempted to 
persuade a delegation of African-American clergymen to sup-
port a plan to create a freedmen’s colony in Central America in 
August 1862, he did so because he entertained the hope that the 
establishment of successful colonies of volunteer black settlers 
would convince whites at home of “the capacity of the allegedly 
inferior black race to work with self-discipline and dedication” 
and thus “deflect racist challenges to emancipation.”
3) He stopped it right away. Although Lincoln supported the cre-
ation of a freedmen’s colony on Île à Vache in 1863, he never 
made participation in colonizing efforts compulsory for eman-
cipated slaves, and once the Île à Vache experiment had been 
tried and failed, Lincoln evacuated the colonists and (accord-
ing to John Hay) “sloughed off that idea” once and for all as 
a “hideous & barbarous humbug.”3
 He was, on these grounds, never more than halfhearted in his en-
dorsement of colonization, never trespassed further on black agency 
than merely to offer support for colonization, and never returned to 
the idea once an initial—and presumably harmless—experiment had 
been tried. Innocence returns to Lincoln, rejoicing. And it returns to 
us, rejoicing too, since we live in the Union Lincoln saved from dis-
solution, and it will be difficult to enjoy that Union fully if its preser-
vation turns out to have been linked to policies that we have come to 
abhor—slavery, segregation, and colonization.
 This is not unlike similar efforts to cleanse Lincoln from the taint 
of social, political, and biological racism; and not unlike those similar 
efforts, it tends to have the aroma of special pleading. No stigma is so 
feared or so devastating in modern American minds as the accusation 
of racism; none is easier to assert, and none is more difficult to cleanse 
away without a certain rolling of the eyes on the part of accusers and 
even onlookers. We repristinate Lincoln on colonization for the same 
reason we repristinate Lincoln on race in general, because we crave 
repristination ourselves.
 3. Gabor Boritt, “Did He Dream of a Lily-White America? The Voyage to Linconia,” 
in The Lincoln Enigma: The Changing Faces of an American Icon (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2001), 8; Philip S. Paludan, The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1994), 132–33; Hay, diary entry for July 1, 1864, in Inside 
Lincoln’s White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, ed. Michael Burlingame 
and J.R.T. Ettlinger (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997), 217.
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 What is difficult for many to grasp is that, for Lincoln, an absolute 
enmity against slavery had little or nothing to do with race. Slavery, in 
the eye of Abraham Lincoln, was the sign of the seeping return of Ro-
mantic aristocracy to American minds. It embodied a hierarchical and 
unmoving social order that liberal democracy and liberal capitalism had 
briefly overthrown in 1776 and 1789, but which had regenerated itself 
like the Hydra’s heads and choked off the hope of popular government 
everywhere but in the American Union. Lincoln’s antislavery was only 
tangentially connected to race, not because he was what we would call 
a racist, but because slavery was bigger than race. Judging Lincoln’s 
bona fides as a Great Emancipator according to the folly of colonization 
is, in its own way, as historically near-sighted as the Sisyphean labors 
of those who try to deny that his embrace of it was folly.
 Phillip Magness and Sebastian Page really have only one argu-
ment to make in Colonization After Emancipation, and it is the one 
most Lincolnites dread: That Lincoln not only favored colonization 
in all the instances previously cited, but that he persisted in favoring 
colonization schemes until almost the day he died and with such 
tenacity that no amount of excuse-mongering can cleanse him from 
association with it. Far from having “sloughed off that idea,” Lincoln 
remained so enamored of it that he initiated a second wave of coloni-
zation projects after the failure of Île à Vache, starting with a plan to 
ship freedmen as workers to British Honduras, and including plans 
for settlements in British Guiana and the Dutch West Indies. He did 
not merely nod in the direction of these plans, argue Magness and 
Page. He was personally involved in these schemes, meeting with 
the British minister to America, Lord Richard Lyons, and putting 
the presidential shoulder behind the self-promoting antics of James 
Mitchell, the U.S. government’s commissioner of emigration. Mitchell 
had been involved closely with colonization efforts in his home state 
of Indiana, and while he genuinely abhorred slavery as a “crime” for 
which “God will hold the guilty responsible, in the day of judgment,” 
he nevertheless believed even free blacks “are a degraded people” 
who are legally boxed-in by “hereditary prejudice against the colored 
race.” For them, said Mitchell, colonization is the only “remedy.” If 
he had said final solution, the impact could not be more ominous.4
 4. Mitchell, Answer of the Agent of the Indiana Colonization Society to the Resolution 
of Inquiry on the Subject of African Colonization, passed by the House of Representatives of 
the General Assembly of the State of Indiana on the 3rd of February 1852 (Indianapolis: J.P. 
Chapman, 1852), 17, 19.
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 That Abraham Lincoln would make himself the umbrella under 
which Mitchell’s plans would be carried out “seems”—as the authors 
appear delighted to point out—“to completely dispel his popular 
reputation as a racial egalitarian” (125), and so we arrive at the real 
eureka of the book. Of course, I am not sure that anyone ever really 
claimed that Lincoln was “a racial egalitarian,” or that any three 
individuals agree on just what a “racial egalitarian” might be, then 
or now. But the point is clear all the same: Abraham Lincoln fails the 
test of modern social virtue. As Richard Thompson Ford remarked 
in The Race Card, even the slightest ambiguity in contemporary racial 
politics demands that the worst be assumed, and Magness and Page 
unhesitatingly assume it.5 The authors modify this charge mildly by 
adding that Lincoln’s “plans for voluntary emigration lacked the cal-
lous deportation to which more serious racial separatists subscribed” 
and added a pinch of “benign reasoning to his brand of coloniza-
tion” (121). But much of that qualification melts away when we are 
asked to remember that “even as black regiments proved themselves 
in battle at Milliken’s Bend and Fort Wagner,” Lincoln was signing 
authorizations for transporting black laborers to Central America. 
It is hard to salvage much of the benign from Lincoln’s advocacy 
of colonization after Magness and Page assert that Lincoln “was a 
principal driving force behind the British project, and he sustained 
it through 1863, by personal intervention when necessary,” and only 
gave up on colonization “from sheer political fatigue” (122–23).
 On what evidence, then, do Magness and Page build their indict-
ment? Because, in spite of the temporizing arguments about Lincoln’s 
lack of “callous” motivations, this book really is an indictment, and 
of the sort Lerone Bennett and Thomas Di Lorenzo and all the tribes 
of Lincoln-haters down through the years will cherish. The answer, 
surprisingly, is none at all.
 Colonization after Emancipation opens on June 13, 1863, with what is 
supposed to be the smoking gun—an order, drafted by Mitchell but 
signed or endorsed by Lincoln, to the chief representative of the Brit-
ish Honduras Company, authorizing the recruitment of emancipated 
slaves as laborers in British Honduras. This is the same order that 
Magness presented as Exhibit A in two sensational articles published 
in this journal in 2008 and 2011, and it is worth quoting in full:
 5. Ford, The Race Card: How Bluffing About Bias Makes Race Relations Worse (New York: 
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2008), 24.
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Emigration Office
Washington D.C. June 11th, 1863
John Hodge of London, and S. R. Dickson, agents of the British 
Colonies of Honduras and Guiana, are here in accordance with 
the well settled policy of the United States, to aid such free per-
sons of color as desire to remove to their colonies. We, therefore, 
recommend all parties and persons having the direction or charge 
of such, to present no hindrance to them or their agents in the 
work of canvassing for emigrants, but to render them and their 
regularly appointed agents, all the aid possible in this work.
James Mitchell
Commissioner of Emigration6
From this, Magness and Page followed the trail of “a succession of 
document discoveries in the British and American National Archives,” 
demonstrating that an unabated interest in colonization “occurred in 
the latter years of Lincoln’s presidency.” This “extensive assemblage of 
letters, pamphlets, and newspaper articles” opened up a view into “a 
previously unknown fact-finding mission” for the purpose of creating 
a Central American freedmens’ colony.
 Lovely, except that Exhibit A is not a Lincoln document, and nei-
ther are the other documents in their “extensive assemblage.” In fact, 
no original of Exhibit A actually exists, only “a second-generation 
secretary’s copy . . . neatly tucked away into an obscure file at the 
Department of the Interior.” This document is supposed to carry an 
endorsement by Lincoln—this is the smoke from the smoking gun—
but no such “endorsement” appears. Magness and Page supply the 
endorsement by citing the report of one of the British Honduras agents 
that Lincoln “handed me the authority which had been drawn up 
by the Govt. Emigration Commissioner [i.e. James Mitchell], signed 
by himself” with the words “I approve the within” (37). That, as the 
authors admit in a long footnote, is it. They believe that Lincoln actu-
ally signed two copies of the order, but neither has survived, and (as 
they coyly concede) “the final disposition of an original in Lincoln’s 
pen remains a puzzle for historians” (139).
 It accomplishes exactly nothing to cite documents that do not exist 
and then smother their non-existence with invocations of “mystery” 
 6. Phillip W. Magness, “Benjamin Butler’s Colonization Testimony Re-evaluated,” 
Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association 29 (Winter 2008): 1—28, and “James Mitchell 
and the Mystery of the Emigration Office Papers,” Journal of the Abraham Lincoln As-
sociation 32 (September 2011): 51–62.
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(x), or to imply (as Magness did in 2011) that “Lincoln’s colonization 
records became so sporadic after January 1863 at least in part because 
they were removed from government files and remain missing to this 
day,” as though some shadowy conspiracy was at work ex machina. In 
his 2011 article on the “mystery” of the trunk Mitchell used to store 
his emigration archive, Magness announced that “Newly discovered 
documents in Lincoln’s handwriting naturally generate historical ex-
citement”—only to follow that bang with the whimper that “there is 
reason to believe that Mitchell’s trunk contained several of them.” The 
trunk and the archive, alas! disappeared after Mitchell’s death in 1904. 
But this acts as no brake on Magness’s lengthy but purely speculative 
description of the possible contents of the trunk. “These and other 
mysteries from Mitchell’s trunk,” Magness solemnly asserts, “tend 
to suggest a more complex and less certain picture of Lincoln’s ideas 
about the future of the freed slaves.” How they perform this feat is 
a mystery in itself, considering as no one alive today seems ever to 
have seen Mitchell’s “archive.”7
 That almost entirely exhausts the store of shattering testimony 
Magness and Page promised to bring against Lincoln’s “popular 
reputation as a racial egalitarian.” They review Lincoln’s other utter-
ances on the subject; they knit together long-published testimonies 
from Gideon Welles, Edward Bates, and many others about Lincoln’s 
interest in colonization in general; and they exhume at least one 
resident of the Civil War’s historical drunk tank, Benjamin Butler, 
and breathe new air into the bubble of Butler’s claim that Lincoln 
discussed colonization with him as late as April 1865. But all of this 
is either well-known enough to be valuable only for having it all in 
one book, or too vague to establish more about Lincoln’s interest in 
colonization than Lincoln himself tells us. So, we are left at the end 
of Colonization After Emancipation with something akin to the old 
Scottish verdict: not proven. History has the license of poetry but not 
the liberty of manufacture.
 But if Magness and Page’s evidence falls somewhere short of con-
vincing us that Lincoln was a bad colonizationist, it’s worth wondering 
what exactly we are left with, if the alternative is to plead for Lincoln as 
a good colonizationist. For there is, at least in my mind, no such thing 
as a good colonizationist. And to find a man who was otherwise so 
radically skeptical of hare-brained schemes of social reform (temper-
ance, for instance) dallying with colonization, is jarring. Even worse, 
 7. Magness, “James Mitchell and the Mystery of the Emigration Office Papers,” 
61–62.
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to find a man who believed so profoundly in the equality of natural 
rights as possessed by blacks and whites alike missing the injustice 
that William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips had no difficulty 
seeing in “schemes of expatriation,” is a disheartening blurring of 
Lincoln’s vision on this issue.8
 But is the jarring Lincoln’s problem or ours, or both? Colonization 
plans of various shapes bitterly divided African-Americans, usually 
serving as a counsel of despair in the face of certain unpleasant racial 
realities. It cannot be too surprising to find Lincoln offering precisely 
that same counsel as a motive for colonization. “Your race are suffering, 
in my judgment, the greatest wrong inflicted on any people,” Lincoln 
said, with unusual frankness for a white man, much less a president 
of the United States in the nineteenth century. “But even when you 
cease to be slaves, you are yet far removed from being placed on an 
equality with the white race,” he added. He saw less chance for equal-
ity in white America and more chance elsewhere. “No sane man,” he 
believed, “will attempt to deny that the African upon his own soil has 
all the natural rights that [the Declaration of Independence] vouchsafes 
to all mankind,” he said in 1858. But the “African” would have little 
chance of realizing them unless and until he was “on his own soil.”9 
(Why the “African” whose ancestors had been on American soil longer 
than Lincoln’s should not consider America as “his soil” was an idea 
that seems never to have occurred to Lincoln).
 Colonization was a counsel to which Lincoln would have been 
better advised not to give in and a counsel he himself sometimes 
shrewdly questioned. “I cannot make it better known than it already 
is, that I strongly favor colonization,” he told Congress in 1862, but 
he balked at appealing to the usual, race-baiting, “largely imaginary, 
if not sometimes malicious” reasons. Lincoln is an example in the 
history of American race relations not of evil people intentionally do-
ing harm, but of decent people doing harm because they don’t know 
what else they could do or did not take the trouble to do something 
else. When Lincoln said in 1854 that “If all earthly power were given 
me, I should not know what to do, as to the existing institution,” he 
was expressing a genuine, if short-sighted, puzzlement. And it is 
 8. Henry Mayer, All On Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 176
 9. Kate Masur, An Example for All the Land: Emancipation and the Struggle Over Equality 
in Washington, D.C. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 35–36; Lin-
coln, “Speech at Carlinville, Illinois” (August 31, 1858) and “Address on Colonization to 
a Deputation of Negroes” (August 14, 1862), in Roy P. Basler et al., eds., Collected Works 
of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1853), 3:79, 5:371–72.
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worth remembering that colonization was not always an end in itself, 
not always an irritated pitching of the entire problem of race over the 
side. Frederick Edge’s comment about the colonization provisions 
of the District emancipation bill being a placebo more than a policy 
should not be tossed aside as easily as Magness and Page do, if only 
because people like Edge were there to take the unspoken temper 
of the times. Granville Sharpe advocated colonization in west Africa 
because he believed it was the best way to interdict the slave trade; 
Salmon Chase thought colonization would create “an Americo-Afric 
state in Central America” and ensure the expansion of republican 
liberty (so long, Chase added, as it was remembered that coloniza-
tion “will not solve our home problems” with race).10
 Nor should we toss aside as lightly as Magness and Page would 
like to do the possibility that Lincoln’s colonization dabbling really 
did have a large element of the placebo built into it. Why else did 
Lincoln arrange for a public meeting with the District of Columbia’s 
African-American clergy, complete with reporters from the Washing-
ton papers to record everything he said? There was no particularly 
large or influential black readership of those papers in 1862; the only 
real significance of Lincoln’s little colonization tableau could be for 
a white readership that needed the oil of reassurance poured onto 
the rough waters of emancipation—a placebo, in other words. This 
does not mean that Lincoln might not have mixed the placebo motive 
with less hallowed motives. But if unhallowed motives had been as 
ensconced in the driver’s-seat as firmly as Magness and Page believe, 
there would have been no reason for the tableau at all.
 Which means that the most telling measure of Lincoln’s interest 
in colonization is in the very thing that Magness and Page have to 
struggle to overcome—the lack of evidence. Had Lincoln in any ener-
getic way been determined to cram colonization down emancipated 
black throats, then the new national energies that the Civil War put 
into his hands as president would have allowed very little to stand 
in his way. Instead, he talked about it, experimented with it once in 
a small-scale way, and never returned to it afterwards. It was a sad 
failure of imagination, and not the only one Lincoln suffered from, 
but in the end, not a major one. Hay was right, and so was Edge. It 
was a humbug, after all.
 10. “Speech at Peoria, Illinois” (October 16, 1854) and “Annual Message to Con-
gress” (December 1, 1862), in Collected Works, 2:255, 5:534; Charles Stuart, A Memoir of 
Granville Sharp (New York: William S. Dorr, 1836), 60, 68; Chase to Thaddeus Stevens, 
in The Selected Papers of Thaddeus Stevens, ed. B.W. Palmer (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 1:320.
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